{"content_id":"6urd4uuydn","slug":"voice-phishing-scams-targeting-older-adults","locale":"en","schema_type":"HowTo","category":"how_to","category_name":"How-to","title":"New Voice-Phishing Tactics Targeting People Aged 50 and Older and Step-by-Step Responses","summary":"Voice phishing is evolving to combine personal information, malicious apps, family details, and even AI voice cloning. This guide explains how to identify common tactics and outlines the immediate steps to take after transferring money or installing an app.","author":{"name":"Injoys Editorial Team","url":"https://injoys.com/ko/about"},"key_points":["Law enforcement agencies and financial institutions do not ask by phone for transfers to a safe account, delivery of cash, or inspection of assets.","If you installed a link or app sent by the other party, do not make a verification call using that phone; use another device.","Even if you hear a family member's voice, hang up and verify it by calling a previously saved number and using a separate family contact channel.","If you sent money, immediately report it to your bank and 112 and request a payment freeze to improve your chances of recovering the funds.","Investment offers that promise both high returns and principal protection, or require an additional deposit to withdraw funds, are serious signs of fraud."],"content_markdown":"Voice phishing is no longer a crime that merely uses awkward speech to demand a bank transfer. Criminals combine leaked personal information, sophisticated impersonation of institutions, remote-control apps, fake investment platforms, information from family members’ social media, and AI-generated voices to undermine victims’ judgment.\n\nMiddle-aged and older adults, in particular, may be heavily targeted because they have accumulated a certain level of assets but may be unfamiliar with new apps and security procedures. However, anyone can be deceived in an emergency regardless of age or digital proficiency, so it is important to establish multiple verification procedures involving family members and financial institutions rather than relying on individual vigilance.\n\n## What to Keep in Mind When Reading 2025 Loss Statistics\n\nAccording to National Police Agency figures cited in materials provided by the operator, domestic voice phishing losses in 2025 reached KRW 1.2578 trillion, exceeding KRW 1 trillion for the first time, and more than half of the victims were reportedly aged 50 or older.\n\nHowever, voice phishing, messenger phishing, investment tip room scams, romance scams, and similar crimes may be classified as different types of crime depending on the reporting agency and statistical criteria. When comparing losses or the proportions by age group, the following conditions should also be checked.\n\n- Whether the figures are based on the year the crime occurred or the year it was reported or solved\n- Whether only bank-transfer-based voice phishing was included\n- Whether virtual asset investment scams and investment tip room scams were included\n- Whether the figures refer to the number of victims, incidents, or transfers\n- Whether the figures are preliminary or final\n\nTherefore, rather than exaggerating the risk based on a single figure, it is advisable to examine the type of crime and the scope of the statistics together.\n\n## 5 Major Tactics Used in New Types of Voice Phishing\n\n### 1. Impersonating Prosecutors, Police, or the Financial Supervisory Service\n\nCriminals gain trust by presenting information that has already been leaked, such as the victim’s name, workplace, address, and financial institutions they use. They then threaten that the victim’s account has been linked to a crime or that the victim may be arrested, and demand a transfer or cash handoff while preventing the victim from ending the call.\n\nIf any of the following demands are made, institutional impersonation should be suspected first.\n\n- They tell the victim not to inform family members or bank employees, citing investigation confidentiality.\n- They instruct the victim to move money to a safe account, protected account, or government-managed account.\n- They ask the victim to send money for an asset inspection or to determine whether the assets are linked to a crime.\n- They instruct the victim to withdraw cash and hand it to a specific person.\n- They send images resembling identification cards or official documents through a messenger app.\n\nReal investigative agencies do not instruct people by phone to move money from their personal accounts to other accounts under the pretext of inspecting their assets. Caller ID information and images of official documents can be manipulated, so they must not be used by themselves to verify identity.\n\n### 2. Inducing Victims to Install Malicious or Remote-Control Apps\n\nCriminals send links under the pretext of checking a case, strengthening security, applying for a loan, receiving a refund, or confirming card delivery. If the installed app obtains excessive accessibility permissions, screen-sharing access, text-message access, or device administrator privileges, calls and financial authentication processes may be exposed.\n\nRemote support programs such as AnyDesk are also used for legitimate work. The danger arises when an unknown person instructs someone over the phone to install one and asks for an access code or control permissions.\n\nOn a phone suspected of having a malicious app, simply searching for an institution’s number and calling it directly may not be enough. Search ads or fake websites may appear, and the malicious app may manipulate the call screen or redirect the call to another number. Turn off the phone or disconnect it from the network, and contact the institution’s official main number using another, uninfected phone.\n\n### 3. Messenger Phishing That Impersonates Children or Family Members\n\nTypical messages say, “My phone is broken,” “I can’t talk right now,” or “I need to make an urgent payment.” Criminals may request not only a transfer but also a photo of an ID, a card number, an account password, or a verification code.\n\nRecently, criminals have collected school, workplace, travel schedule, and family nickname information from public social media posts to make conversations sound natural. Even if the profile photo and family information are accurate, that does not prove the person is actually a family member.\n\nTo verify, stop the messenger conversation and call the originally saved number directly. If the person cannot be reached, verify through a previously known contact network, such as another family member or the person’s workplace.\n\n### 4. Investment Tip Rooms and Fake Trading Platforms\n\nCriminals approach victims through free stock recommendations or advertisements impersonating famous experts, then direct them to group chat rooms. Other participants repeatedly post proof of profits, but these may also be accounts operated by the criminal organization.\n\nProfits displayed in a fake app or website are not real assets. Criminals may allow one small withdrawal to gain trust before inducing the victim to increase the investment. When the victim requests a withdrawal, they demand additional payments for taxes, deposits, membership upgrades, or anti-money-laundering verification fees.\n\nThe following combination is a very strong warning sign.\n\n- They promise both principal protection and unusually high returns.\n- They instruct the victim to deposit money into accounts held in individuals’ names or accounts that keep changing.\n- They demand that taxes or fees be paid in advance before a withdrawal.\n- It is difficult to verify the company’s registration as a financial institution or its actual office.\n- They emphasize credibility solely through celebrity photos and media outlet logos.\n\nDeposits covered by deposit insurance and products with legally established guarantee structures do exist separately, so not every product can be deemed fraudulent merely because it uses the phrase “principal protection.” However, when a stranger promotes a high-return investment while claiming the principal is protected, it is a signal to stop the transaction immediately.\n\n### 5. Impersonating Family Members With AI-Generated Voices and Videos\n\nIf publicly available voice or video material exists, generative AI can be used to imitate a specific person’s voice and face. The quality of the synthesis varies depending on the source material, model, and call environment, so it is inaccurate to describe it using fixed figures such as “it can be replicated with 99% accuracy in just a few seconds.”\n\nThe important point is that identity must not be confirmed based on voice and video alone. Even if the caller presents an urgent story involving kidnapping, an accident, or hospital bills, end the call first and verify through an independent contact channel. Video calls may also be generated or use prerecorded footage, so they are not sufficient as a standalone means of verification.\n\n## A 30-Second Response When You Receive a Call or Message\n\n1. **Do not carry out the request.** Stop any transfer, cash withdrawal, app installation, screen sharing, or transmission of personal information.\n2. **Hang up without explaining or arguing.** The longer the call continues, the more you are exposed to fear and time pressure.\n3. **Verify through another channel.** Contact family members using their previously saved numbers, and contact institutions using the main numbers listed on their official websites or documents.\n4. **If you installed an app, use another device.** Put the affected phone in airplane mode or turn it off.\n5. **If you sent money, report it immediately.** Ask the bank’s customer service center and the police at 112 to freeze the payment.\n\nIt is safer not to use phone numbers from search-result advertisements, numbers provided by the other party, or links in text messages for verification.\n\n## Verification Rules for Families to Establish Together\n\nA family passphrase can serve as a supplementary way to identify AI impersonation. However, it may be leaked if it remains in messenger records or on social media, so it must not be relied on by itself.\n\nRecommended family verification rules include the following.\n\n- When a transfer request is received, always call back using the previously saved number.\n- Designate a second family member or acquaintance to contact if the person cannot be reached.\n- Do not record the passphrase online, and change it periodically.\n- Ask about a recent family experience that would be difficult for the other person to look up.\n- Transfers at or above a set amount should be made only after verification by two family members.\n- Reduce the visibility of phone numbers, schools, workplaces, travel schedules, and family relationships on social media.\n\nDo not send money merely because the person answered the passphrase correctly. Independent verification by calling back through an existing contact number is essential.\n\n## What to Do After Installing a Malicious App\n\n### Step 1: Disconnect Communications\n\nPut the phone in airplane mode or turn it off. It is also advisable to turn off Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. Do not reopen financial apps or change passwords on the device.\n\n### Step 2: Report From a Clean Device\n\nUse another uninfected phone or computer to contact the following organizations.\n\n- Emergency and voice phishing reports: Police 112\n- Financial consultations and guidance on responding to losses: Financial Supervisory Service 1332\n- Malicious app and smishing consultations: Korea Internet \u0026 Security Agency 118\n- The official customer service centers of the relevant bank and card company\n\n### Step 3: Protect Financial and Telecommunications Services\n\nFrom a clean device, consult the financial institution and request an account payment freeze, card suspension, revocation of digital certificates, and blocking of electronic financial access. Also contact the mobile carrier to request a SIM replacement or check for possible identity theft.\n\nThrough the identity theft prevention service Msafer, users can check telecommunications services registered in their name and set restrictions on new subscriptions.\n\n### Step 4: Preserve Evidence and Inspect the Device\n\nText messages, phone numbers, account numbers, transfer records, and conversation logs may be needed for investigations and recovery procedures. Record and preserve them as safely as possible, then follow guidance from the police, financial institution, or manufacturer’s service center.\n\nDeleting only the app icon does not guarantee that the device is safe. Permissions and accounts may remain, so have the device inspected at an official service center and perform a factory reset if necessary. It is safer to reset the device only after first consulting professionals about evidence preservation and account protection measures.\n\n## What to Do If You Have Already Sent Money\n\nAs time passes, the money is increasingly likely to be moved to another account or converted into virtual assets. Take immediate action in the following order.\n\n1. Inform the customer service center of the financial institution used for the transfer that you were a victim of voice phishing and request a payment freeze.\n2. Report the incident to the police at 112 and provide the recipient’s account number, phone number, and the time of the transfer.\n3. Follow the financial institution’s instructions and submit the documents required to apply for victim relief.\n4. If you also provided identification or authentication information, check for misuse involving cards, accounts, certificates, and mobile phone services in your name.\n5. Beware of secondary scams that demand fees while claiming they can facilitate a withdrawal or refund.\n\nEven if a payment freeze is requested, money that has already been withdrawn or transferred to another account may not be recovered. Reporting the incident also does not automatically guarantee a refund. Nevertheless, prompt reporting is important for preventing additional transfers and beginning the victim relief process.\n\n## Assess Risky Phrases in Context\n\nExpressions such as “case inquiry,” “asset inspection,” “asset transfer,” “security account,” “embargo,” and “summary investigation” are common warning signs that may be used in institutional impersonation scams. However, a crime must not be considered 100% certain merely because a specific term was used, nor should a situation be considered safe because the term was absent.\n\nThe key criterion is the action being demanded, not the words being used. If the person requests even one of the following—secrecy, an immediate transfer, a cash handoff, app installation, screen sharing, or a verification code—end the call and verify independently.\n\n## Monthly Prevention Checklist\n\n| Item to Check | Recommended Action |\n|---|---|\n| Mobile phone apps | Check for unused apps, apps from unknown sources, and excessive accessibility permissions |\n| Operating system | Enable security updates and automatic updates |\n| Financial alerts | Set up alerts for account withdrawals and card payments |\n| Transfer limits | Lower them to the level normally needed and require additional verification for large transfers |\n| Telecommunications accounts | Check subscription status and restrictions on new subscriptions through Msafer |\n| Social media visibility | Minimize public exposure of family relationships, schedules, phone numbers, and voice or video content |\n| Family contact network | Reconfirm existing numbers and update secondary contacts and passphrases |\n\nNo guideline can guarantee complete protection from losses. The most effective principle is to step away from the urgency created by the other party, end the call, and verify again using another device and an independent contact number.","content_html":"\u003cp\u003eVoice phishing is no longer a crime that merely uses awkward speech to demand a bank transfer. Criminals combine leaked personal information, sophisticated impersonation of institutions, remote-control apps, fake investment platforms, information from family members’ social media, and AI-generated voices to undermine victims’ judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMiddle-aged and older adults, in particular, may be heavily targeted because they have accumulated a certain level of assets but may be unfamiliar with new apps and security procedures. However, anyone can be deceived in an emergency regardless of age or digital proficiency, so it is important to establish multiple verification procedures involving family members and financial institutions rather than relying on individual vigilance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#what-to-keep-in-mind-when-reading-2025-loss-statistics\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"what-to-keep-in-mind-when-reading-2025-loss-statistics\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWhat to Keep in Mind When Reading 2025 Loss Statistics\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to National Police Agency figures cited in materials provided by the operator, domestic voice phishing losses in 2025 reached KRW 1.2578 trillion, exceeding KRW 1 trillion for the first time, and more than half of the victims were reportedly aged 50 or older.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, voice phishing, messenger phishing, investment tip room scams, romance scams, and similar crimes may be classified as different types of crime depending on the reporting agency and statistical criteria. When comparing losses or the proportions by age group, the following conditions should also be checked.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhether the figures are based on the year the crime occurred or the year it was reported or solved\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhether only bank-transfer-based voice phishing was included\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhether virtual asset investment scams and investment tip room scams were included\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhether the figures refer to the number of victims, incidents, or transfers\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhether the figures are preliminary or final\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTherefore, rather than exaggerating the risk based on a single figure, it is advisable to examine the type of crime and the scope of the statistics together.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#5-major-tactics-used-in-new-types-of-voice-phishing\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"5-major-tactics-used-in-new-types-of-voice-phishing\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e5 Major Tactics Used in New Types of Voice Phishing\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#1-impersonating-prosecutors-police-or-the-financial-supervisory-service\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"1-impersonating-prosecutors-police-or-the-financial-supervisory-service\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e1. Impersonating Prosecutors, Police, or the Financial Supervisory Service\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriminals gain trust by presenting information that has already been leaked, such as the victim’s name, workplace, address, and financial institutions they use. They then threaten that the victim’s account has been linked to a crime or that the victim may be arrested, and demand a transfer or cash handoff while preventing the victim from ending the call.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf any of the following demands are made, institutional impersonation should be suspected first.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey tell the victim not to inform family members or bank employees, citing investigation confidentiality.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey instruct the victim to move money to a safe account, protected account, or government-managed account.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey ask the victim to send money for an asset inspection or to determine whether the assets are linked to a crime.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey instruct the victim to withdraw cash and hand it to a specific person.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey send images resembling identification cards or official documents through a messenger app.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eReal investigative agencies do not instruct people by phone to move money from their personal accounts to other accounts under the pretext of inspecting their assets. Caller ID information and images of official documents can be manipulated, so they must not be used by themselves to verify identity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#2-inducing-victims-to-install-malicious-or-remote-control-apps\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"2-inducing-victims-to-install-malicious-or-remote-control-apps\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e2. Inducing Victims to Install Malicious or Remote-Control Apps\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriminals send links under the pretext of checking a case, strengthening security, applying for a loan, receiving a refund, or confirming card delivery. If the installed app obtains excessive accessibility permissions, screen-sharing access, text-message access, or device administrator privileges, calls and financial authentication processes may be exposed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRemote support programs such as AnyDesk are also used for legitimate work. The danger arises when an unknown person instructs someone over the phone to install one and asks for an access code or control permissions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn a phone suspected of having a malicious app, simply searching for an institution’s number and calling it directly may not be enough. Search ads or fake websites may appear, and the malicious app may manipulate the call screen or redirect the call to another number. Turn off the phone or disconnect it from the network, and contact the institution’s official main number using another, uninfected phone.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#3-messenger-phishing-that-impersonates-children-or-family-members\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"3-messenger-phishing-that-impersonates-children-or-family-members\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e3. Messenger Phishing That Impersonates Children or Family Members\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTypical messages say, “My phone is broken,” “I can’t talk right now,” or “I need to make an urgent payment.” Criminals may request not only a transfer but also a photo of an ID, a card number, an account password, or a verification code.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRecently, criminals have collected school, workplace, travel schedule, and family nickname information from public social media posts to make conversations sound natural. Even if the profile photo and family information are accurate, that does not prove the person is actually a family member.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo verify, stop the messenger conversation and call the originally saved number directly. If the person cannot be reached, verify through a previously known contact network, such as another family member or the person’s workplace.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#4-investment-tip-rooms-and-fake-trading-platforms\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"4-investment-tip-rooms-and-fake-trading-platforms\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e4. Investment Tip Rooms and Fake Trading Platforms\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriminals approach victims through free stock recommendations or advertisements impersonating famous experts, then direct them to group chat rooms. Other participants repeatedly post proof of profits, but these may also be accounts operated by the criminal organization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eProfits displayed in a fake app or website are not real assets. Criminals may allow one small withdrawal to gain trust before inducing the victim to increase the investment. When the victim requests a withdrawal, they demand additional payments for taxes, deposits, membership upgrades, or anti-money-laundering verification fees.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe following combination is a very strong warning sign.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey promise both principal protection and unusually high returns.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey instruct the victim to deposit money into accounts held in individuals’ names or accounts that keep changing.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey demand that taxes or fees be paid in advance before a withdrawal.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIt is difficult to verify the company’s registration as a financial institution or its actual office.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThey emphasize credibility solely through celebrity photos and media outlet logos.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDeposits covered by deposit insurance and products with legally established guarantee structures do exist separately, so not every product can be deemed fraudulent merely because it uses the phrase “principal protection.” However, when a stranger promotes a high-return investment while claiming the principal is protected, it is a signal to stop the transaction immediately.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#5-impersonating-family-members-with-ai-generated-voices-and-videos\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"5-impersonating-family-members-with-ai-generated-voices-and-videos\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e5. Impersonating Family Members With AI-Generated Voices and Videos\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf publicly available voice or video material exists, generative AI can be used to imitate a specific person’s voice and face. The quality of the synthesis varies depending on the source material, model, and call environment, so it is inaccurate to describe it using fixed figures such as “it can be replicated with 99% accuracy in just a few seconds.”\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe important point is that identity must not be confirmed based on voice and video alone. Even if the caller presents an urgent story involving kidnapping, an accident, or hospital bills, end the call first and verify through an independent contact channel. Video calls may also be generated or use prerecorded footage, so they are not sufficient as a standalone means of verification.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#a-30-second-response-when-you-receive-a-call-or-message\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"a-30-second-response-when-you-receive-a-call-or-message\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eA 30-Second Response When You Receive a Call or Message\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eDo not carry out the request.\u003c/strong\u003e Stop any transfer, cash withdrawal, app installation, screen sharing, or transmission of personal information.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eHang up without explaining or arguing.\u003c/strong\u003e The longer the call continues, the more you are exposed to fear and time pressure.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eVerify through another channel.\u003c/strong\u003e Contact family members using their previously saved numbers, and contact institutions using the main numbers listed on their official websites or documents.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eIf you installed an app, use another device.\u003c/strong\u003e Put the affected phone in airplane mode or turn it off.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eIf you sent money, report it immediately.\u003c/strong\u003e Ask the bank’s customer service center and the police at 112 to freeze the payment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is safer not to use phone numbers from search-result advertisements, numbers provided by the other party, or links in text messages for verification.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#verification-rules-for-families-to-establish-together\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"verification-rules-for-families-to-establish-together\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVerification Rules for Families to Establish Together\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA family passphrase can serve as a supplementary way to identify AI impersonation. However, it may be leaked if it remains in messenger records or on social media, so it must not be relied on by itself.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRecommended family verification rules include the following.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhen a transfer request is received, always call back using the previously saved number.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDesignate a second family member or acquaintance to contact if the person cannot be reached.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDo not record the passphrase online, and change it periodically.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAsk about a recent family experience that would be difficult for the other person to look up.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTransfers at or above a set amount should be made only after verification by two family members.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReduce the visibility of phone numbers, schools, workplaces, travel schedules, and family relationships on social media.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDo not send money merely because the person answered the passphrase correctly. Independent verification by calling back through an existing contact number is essential.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#what-to-do-after-installing-a-malicious-app\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"what-to-do-after-installing-a-malicious-app\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWhat to Do After Installing a Malicious App\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#step-1-disconnect-communications\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"step-1-disconnect-communications\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eStep 1: Disconnect Communications\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePut the phone in airplane mode or turn it off. It is also advisable to turn off Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. Do not reopen financial apps or change passwords on the device.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#step-2-report-from-a-clean-device\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"step-2-report-from-a-clean-device\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eStep 2: Report From a Clean Device\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUse another uninfected phone or computer to contact the following organizations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEmergency and voice phishing reports: Police 112\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFinancial consultations and guidance on responding to losses: Financial Supervisory Service 1332\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMalicious app and smishing consultations: Korea Internet \u0026amp; Security Agency 118\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe official customer service centers of the relevant bank and card company\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#step-3-protect-financial-and-telecommunications-services\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"step-3-protect-financial-and-telecommunications-services\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eStep 3: Protect Financial and Telecommunications Services\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrom a clean device, consult the financial institution and request an account payment freeze, card suspension, revocation of digital certificates, and blocking of electronic financial access. Also contact the mobile carrier to request a SIM replacement or check for possible identity theft.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThrough the identity theft prevention service Msafer, users can check telecommunications services registered in their name and set restrictions on new subscriptions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#step-4-preserve-evidence-and-inspect-the-device\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"step-4-preserve-evidence-and-inspect-the-device\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eStep 4: Preserve Evidence and Inspect the Device\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eText messages, phone numbers, account numbers, transfer records, and conversation logs may be needed for investigations and recovery procedures. Record and preserve them as safely as possible, then follow guidance from the police, financial institution, or manufacturer’s service center.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDeleting only the app icon does not guarantee that the device is safe. Permissions and accounts may remain, so have the device inspected at an official service center and perform a factory reset if necessary. It is safer to reset the device only after first consulting professionals about evidence preservation and account protection measures.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#what-to-do-if-you-have-already-sent-money\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"what-to-do-if-you-have-already-sent-money\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWhat to Do If You Have Already Sent Money\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs time passes, the money is increasingly likely to be moved to another account or converted into virtual assets. Take immediate action in the following order.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInform the customer service center of the financial institution used for the transfer that you were a victim of voice phishing and request a payment freeze.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReport the incident to the police at 112 and provide the recipient’s account number, phone number, and the time of the transfer.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFollow the financial institution’s instructions and submit the documents required to apply for victim relief.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf you also provided identification or authentication information, check for misuse involving cards, accounts, certificates, and mobile phone services in your name.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBeware of secondary scams that demand fees while claiming they can facilitate a withdrawal or refund.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEven if a payment freeze is requested, money that has already been withdrawn or transferred to another account may not be recovered. Reporting the incident also does not automatically guarantee a refund. Nevertheless, prompt reporting is important for preventing additional transfers and beginning the victim relief process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#assess-risky-phrases-in-context\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"assess-risky-phrases-in-context\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAssess Risky Phrases in Context\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExpressions such as “case inquiry,” “asset inspection,” “asset transfer,” “security account,” “embargo,” and “summary investigation” are common warning signs that may be used in institutional impersonation scams. However, a crime must not be considered 100% certain merely because a specific term was used, nor should a situation be considered safe because the term was absent.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe key criterion is the action being demanded, not the words being used. If the person requests even one of the following—secrecy, an immediate transfer, a cash handoff, app installation, screen sharing, or a verification code—end the call and verify independently.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#monthly-prevention-checklist\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"monthly-prevention-checklist\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eMonthly Prevention Checklist\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"overflow-x-auto\"\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\n\u003cthead\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eItem to Check\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eRecommended Action\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/thead\u003e\n\u003ctbody\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Item to Check\"\u003eMobile phone apps\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Recommended Action\"\u003eCheck for unused apps, apps from unknown sources, and excessive accessibility permissions\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Item to Check\"\u003eOperating system\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Recommended Action\"\u003eEnable security updates and automatic updates\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Item to Check\"\u003eFinancial alerts\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Recommended Action\"\u003eSet up alerts for account withdrawals and card payments\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Item to Check\"\u003eTransfer limits\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Recommended Action\"\u003eLower them to the level normally needed and require additional verification for large transfers\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Item to Check\"\u003eTelecommunications accounts\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Recommended Action\"\u003eCheck subscription status and restrictions on new subscriptions through Msafer\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Item to Check\"\u003eSocial media visibility\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Recommended Action\"\u003eMinimize public exposure of family relationships, schedules, phone numbers, and voice or video content\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Item to Check\"\u003eFamily contact network\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Recommended Action\"\u003eReconfirm existing numbers and update secondary contacts and passphrases\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNo guideline can guarantee complete protection from losses. The most effective principle is to step away from the urgency created by the other party, end the call, and verify again using another device and an independent contact number.\u003c/p\u003e\n","tags":["Voice phishing","Financial fraud","Malicious app","Family impersonation","Deepfake","Fraud response"],"faqs":[{"question":"Can prosecutors or the police tell me to transfer money to a secure account?","answer":"No. Investigative authorities do not call individuals and ask them to transfer money to another account or hand over cash under the pretext of protecting or inspecting their assets. If you receive such a request, hang up and verify it by calling 112 or the agency's official main number from another phone."},{"question":"Is it always a scam if a stranger asks me to install a remote access app such as AnyDesk?","answer":"Remote access software itself is also used for legitimate customer support and business purposes. However, if a stranger who called you first asks you to install it and provide an access code for reasons such as handling a case, obtaining a loan, receiving a refund, or ensuring security, it is highly likely to be voice phishing, so you should not comply."},{"question":"Can I call 112 from a phone on which a malicious app has been installed?","answer":"If possible, it is safer to disconnect the device from communications and report the incident using someone else's mobile phone or a landline. This is because the possibility that the malicious app could manipulate the call screen or connection process cannot be ruled out."},{"question":"How should I verify it if the voice sounds exactly like a family member's?","answer":"End the current call and call back using the family member's number already saved in your contacts. If you cannot reach them, verify the situation through another contact channel you already know, such as another family member, their workplace, or their school, and hold off on transferring money until verification is complete."},{"question":"Is knowing a family password enough to prevent deepfake voice phishing?","answer":"A password is only a supplementary measure. Because it may be exposed through messaging history or family conversations, even if the caller answers the password correctly, you should call back using the existing number and cross-check with another family member."},{"question":"If an investment app displays a profit, is it an actual profit?","answer":"Not necessarily. Fake apps and websites created by scammers can display arbitrary profits and balances. If you are asked to deposit additional money for taxes, a security deposit, or fees in order to make a withdrawal, do not send any more money and stop the transaction."},{"question":"If I have already transferred money, whom should I contact first?","answer":"Immediately contact the official customer service center of the bank from which you made the transfer and the police at 112, report the voice phishing loss and the recipient's account, and request that payments be suspended. Then submit the documents required to apply for loss recovery according to the financial institution's instructions."},{"question":"Is it safe just to delete a malicious app?","answer":"Deleting only the app icon does not guarantee safety. Device administrator privileges, accessibility permissions, or account access may remain, so disconnect the device from communications, have it inspected at an official service center, and, after preserving evidence and securing your accounts, perform a factory reset if necessary."},{"question":"Can I get all my money back after reporting voice phishing?","answer":"Reporting the incident and suspending payments do not guarantee a refund. Money that has already been withdrawn or moved to another account may be difficult to recover, but promptly reporting the incident is important for freezing the remaining stolen funds and initiating the official loss recovery process."}],"sources":[{"url":"https://www.police.go.kr/index.do","title":"National Police Agency","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.fss.or.kr/fss/main/main.do","title":"Financial Supervisory Service","type":"source"},{"url":"https://fine.fss.or.kr/main/index.jsp","title":"Financial Consumer Information Portal FINE","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.boho.or.kr/","title":"Korea Internet \u0026 Security Agency Boho Nara","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.msafer.or.kr/index.do","title":"Identity Theft Prevention Service Msafer","type":"source"}],"images":[{"id":506,"url":"https://injoys.com/rails/active_storage/blobs/proxy/eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsiZGF0YSI6NjAzMSwicHVyIjoiYmxvYl9pZCJ9fQ==--51683b4901ba594113d65c98d1ae47d9b2220628/ai-07d47b1d.webp","is_representative":true,"generation_method":"ai_image","license":"ai_generated","mime_type":"image/webp","translations":{"ko":{"alt":"스마트폰을 보는 노인과 사칭범, 악성코드, 금전 피해, 보호 방패를 나타낸 보이스피싱 예방 삽화","caption":"가족과 금융기관의 확인을 통해 노년층을 보이스피싱으로부터 보호하는 과정을 보여준다.","description":null},"en":{"alt":"Senior using a smartphone amid masked impersonators, malware, financial loss, and a protective shield","caption":"The illustration shows family and bank safeguards protecting an older adult from voice phishing.","description":null},"ja":{"alt":"スマートフォンを見る高齢者と、仮面の詐欺師、マルウェア、金銭被害、防御の盾を描いたイラスト","caption":"家族や金融機関との確認で高齢者をボイスフィッシングから守る様子を示している。","description":null},"es":{"alt":"Persona mayor con un móvil rodeada de impostores, malware, pérdidas financieras y un escudo protector","caption":"La ilustración muestra cómo la familia y el banco protegen a una persona mayor del fraude telefónico.","description":null},"id":{"alt":"Lansia memakai ponsel di tengah penyamar, malware, kerugian finansial, dan perisai pelindung","caption":"Ilustrasi ini menunjukkan perlindungan keluarga dan bank bagi lansia dari penipuan suara.","description":null},"pt":{"alt":"Idosa com celular cercada por impostores, malware, perdas financeiras e um escudo de proteção","caption":"A ilustração mostra a família e o banco protegendo uma idosa contra golpes por telefone.","description":null},"zh-hant":{"alt":"長者使用手機，周圍有冒充者、惡意程式、金錢損失與防護盾牌","caption":"插圖呈現家人與金融機構協助保護長者免受語音詐騙。","description":null},"de":{"alt":"Seniorin am Smartphone, umgeben von Betrügern, Schadsoftware, Geldverlust und einem Schutzschild","caption":"Die Illustration zeigt, wie Familie und Bank ältere Menschen vor Telefonbetrug schützen.","description":null}}},{"id":507,"url":"https://injoys.com/rails/active_storage/blobs/proxy/eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsiZGF0YSI6NjAzNywicHVyIjoiYmxvYl9pZCJ9fQ==--5bd1fc6f947c6405393bc6eb9f0e032140fd64be/ai-efe91089.webp","is_representative":false,"generation_method":"ai_image","license":"ai_generated","mime_type":"image/webp","translations":{"ko":{"alt":"낚싯바늘에 걸린 스마트폰과 보안 방패, 금융기관, 고령자, 송금 차단 과정을 그린 보이스피싱 예방 삽화","caption":"보이스피싱을 탐지하고 금융기관 및 관계 기관과 연계해 피해 송금을 차단하는 과정을 보여준다.","description":null},"en":{"alt":"Voice phishing prevention graphic with a hooked phone, security shield, seniors, bank, and blocked money transfer","caption":"The graphic shows how suspicious calls and money transfers can be detected and blocked with institutional support.","description":null},"ja":{"alt":"釣り針に掛かったスマホ、セキュリティ盾、高齢者、銀行、送金阻止の流れを描いた特殊詐欺対策図","caption":"不審な電話や送金を検知し、金融機関などと連携して被害を防ぐ流れを示している。","description":null},"es":{"alt":"Gráfico antifraude con un móvil enganchado, escudo de seguridad, mayores, banco y transferencia bloqueada","caption":"El gráfico muestra cómo detectar llamadas y transferencias sospechosas y bloquearlas con apoyo institucional.","description":null},"id":{"alt":"Ilustrasi pencegahan phishing suara dengan ponsel berkait, perisai, lansia, bank, dan transfer yang diblokir","caption":"Ilustrasi ini menunjukkan cara mendeteksi panggilan dan transfer mencurigakan lalu memblokirnya dengan bantuan lembaga terkait.","description":null},"pt":{"alt":"Gráfico de prevenção a golpes com celular fisgado, escudo, idosos, banco e transferência de dinheiro bloqueada","caption":"O gráfico mostra como detectar chamadas e transferências suspeitas e bloqueá-las com apoio institucional.","description":null},"zh-hant":{"alt":"語音詐騙防範圖，呈現被魚鉤勾住的手機、安全盾牌、長者、銀行與遭攔截的匯款","caption":"圖中說明如何偵測可疑來電與匯款，並透過金融及相關機構協力攔阻詐騙。","description":null},"de":{"alt":"Betrugsprävention mit gehaktem Smartphone, Schutzschild, Senioren, Bank und gestoppter Geldüberweisung","caption":"Die Grafik zeigt, wie verdächtige Anrufe und Überweisungen erkannt und mit institutioneller Hilfe gestoppt werden.","description":null}}}],"published_at":"2026-08-06T16:02:42+09:00","updated_at":"2026-08-06T16:02:42+09:00","license":"cc_by","translation_status":"reviewed","available_locales":["ko","en","ja","es"],"data_locales":["ko","en","ja","es","id","pt","zh-hant","de"],"url":"https://injoys.com/en/articles/voice-phishing-scams-targeting-older-adults"}