{"content_id":"a0shyltydl","slug":"middle-east-war-gulf-states-diplomacy-gains-losses","locale":"en","schema_type":"Article","category":"report","category_name":"Report","title":"Gulf States' Middle East War Diplomacy: Gains and Losses","summary":"Gulf states' diplomacy combines military cooperation with managing relations with Iran. Comparing each country's interests and the vulnerability of desalination and energy facilities makes it hard to conclude that the US is leaving or that China has won outright.","sponsorship_disclosure":null,"affiliate_disclosure":null,"commerce_disclosure":null,"author":{"name":"Injoys Editorial Team","url":"https://injoys.com/ko/about"},"key_points":["Gulf states manage relations with Iran differently depending on territorial disputes, energy resources, and development plans.","The vulnerability of desalination facilities raises the cost of escalation, but it is not the only factor in decisions about military responses.","China's diplomatic gains must be assessed alongside its losses from disruptions to Middle Eastern energy supplies.","The use of BeiDou alone does not mean US military combat intelligence is automatically passed to China.","Assessing gains and losses from the Middle East war requires looking beyond oil prices to actual export volumes and damage to infrastructure."],"content_markdown":"The winners and losers of a war in the Middle East cannot be determined by military outcomes alone. Gulf states have pursued security cooperation while managing their relations with Iran. Damage to desalination and export facilities must be weighed alongside diplomatic gains.\n\nThe maritime shipping figures are based on EIA data for the first half of 2025.\n\n## What is the Gulf states' balanced diplomacy?\n\nThe Gulf states' balanced diplomacy means choosing partners according to the issue. They can cooperate militarily with the United States while talking with Iran. They can also maintain economic cooperation with China alongside those relationships.\n\nIn this article, Gulf states means the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. Iran is a Gulf coastal state, but it is not a GCC member.\n\nArab and Islamic are different categories. Arab refers to a linguistic and cultural identity. Islam is a religion. Grouping Iran and Türkiye with Arab states leads to a mistaken reading of their relationships.\n\nSectarian divisions alone cannot explain foreign policy, either. Territorial disputes and resource development create separate interests. Reducing conflict with neighboring states can also help protect the political system.\n\n## Comparing the interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman\n\nGulf states have different reasons both to disagree with Iran and to talk with it. Restoring diplomatic relations does not mean resolving every security conflict. Conversely, a territorial dispute does not always end diplomatic contact.\n\n| Country | Confirmed relationships and interests | How to interpret its diplomacy |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Saudi Arabia | Agreed to resume diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 | Distinguish normalization from security competition |\n| UAE | Territorial dispute with Iran over islands; normalized relations with Israel | Examine territorial and security issues separately from diplomatic channels |\n| Qatar | Resource structure involving an offshore gas field connected to Iran | Consider both resource development and the safety of export routes |\n| Oman | Mediated talks between the United States and Iran | Distinguish mediation from support for a particular side |\n\n### Saudi Arabia's development plans and relations with Iran\n\nSaudi Arabia created a channel for managing conflict by restoring relations with Iran. The two countries agreed in Beijing on March 10, 2023, to resume relations. Their joint statement also included principles of respect for sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. The original text is available in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' [trilateral joint statement](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/xwlb_663592/202303/t20230311_11039241.html).\n\nSaudi Arabia's Vision 2030 seeks to diversify its economy. Its goals also include expanding tourism, logistics, and private investment. It is reasonable to interpret regional instability as raising the cost of these projects. But development plans alone cannot explain every foreign policy decision. [Vision 2030 overview](https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/overview)\n\n### The UAE's territorial dispute and diplomatic channels\n\nThe conflict between the UAE and Iran includes a specific territorial issue. Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb are disputed islands. Iran controls the islands, while the UAE claims sovereignty over them. The GCC also supports the UAE's position. [GCC Ministerial Council statement](https://gccsg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-6-2-3.aspx)\n\nThe UAE signed a treaty normalizing relations with Israel in 2020. In 2022, it announced plans to return its ambassador to Iran. The two decisions show how it maintained different diplomatic relationships at the same time. Labeling the UAE pro-Israel does not explain its entire policy toward Iran. [UN treaty record](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002805a7d1f), [UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement on the ambassador's return](https://www.mofa.gov.ae/ar-ae/mediahub/news/2022/8/21/21-08-2022-uae)\n\n### Qatar's gas field and Oman's mediation\n\nQatar produces resources from an offshore gas field connected to Iran. The Qatari side is called the North Field. The Iranian side is called South Pars. This structure gives the two countries reason to consider energy stability in their relationship. [EIA analysis of Qatar](https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/countries/qat)\n\nOman's role is to keep a channel for dialogue open. Oman mediated negotiations between the United States and Iran in 2025. But in June of the same year, it announced the cancellation of scheduled talks. The existence of a mediation channel does not guarantee successful negotiations. [Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement of June 14, 2025](https://www.fm.gov.om/en/25922/)\n\n## Why are desalination facilities a security issue?\n\nDesalination facilities are infrastructure that keeps cities supplied with water. Desalination removes salt from seawater to produce fresh water. In the Gulf region, water production and energy supply are closely linked. Water security is therefore hard to separate from power generation and transmission facilities. [World Bank analysis of water and energy in the Gulf](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gcc/publication/advancing-knowledge-of-the-water-energy-nexus-in-the-gcc-countries)\n\nTo compare levels of dependence, the ratios must first use the same basis. The share of drinking water supplied by desalination differs from its share of total water use. Total water use may also include water used in agriculture and industry. Production capacity and actual supply are different measures, too.\n\n| Basis of the figure | What it shows | Common misunderstanding |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Desalination's share of drinking water supply | The composition of the drinking water supply | Assuming the same share applies to agricultural water |\n| Desalination's share of total water use | How water is used for various purposes | Assuming cities have low dependence on desalinated drinking water |\n| Production capacity of desalination facilities | How much the facilities can produce | Treating capacity as identical to actual supply |\n| Emergency water reserves | The amount of stored water | Treating them as the time a city can last without restrictions on use |\n\nDamage to desalination facilities does not mean an entire city immediately loses its water supply. Reservoirs and connecting pipelines can cushion the impact. Qatar's KAHRAMAA describes reservoir and pipeline projects for emergency response. How long supplies would actually last depends on the extent of the damage and the amount of water used. [KAHRAMAA's description of its water security projects](https://www.km.qa/MediaCenter/pages/NewsDetails.aspx?ItemID=354)\n\nClaims that a city would collapse within a specific period therefore need separate verification. Each country's water reserves and the operating status of its facilities must be checked first. It is reasonable to conclude that the vulnerability of desalination facilities raises the cost of escalation. It cannot be identified as the sole reason for every act of military restraint.\n\n## Have the United States' exit and China's victory been confirmed?\n\nThere is not enough evidence to conclude that the United States' security role in the Middle East has ended. In January 2026, US Central Command announced the opening of an air defense cooperation unit at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Its purpose is to strengthen regional cooperation on integrated air and missile defense. [US Central Command announcement](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4376614/us-regional-partners-open-new-air-defense-operations-cell-in-qatar/)\n\nThat announcement alone cannot establish how well the defense system performs in combat. But it must be distinguished from a claim that the cooperation structure has disappeared. The fact that an attack caused damage does not mean the United States has fully withdrawn. Defensive performance and the continuation of its presence and cooperation are different questions.\n\nChina gained a diplomatic achievement in the process of restoring relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the same time, China has an interest in the Gulf region's energy supply. EIA describes China as a major destination for energy passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Diplomatic gains alone therefore cannot establish China's overall net gain from a war. [Trilateral joint statement](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/xwlb_663592/202303/t20230311_11039241.html), [EIA maritime shipping analysis](https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/?id_mc=277158333)\n\n| What is being assessed | Indicators to check | Conclusion that is hard to justify |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| The United States' security role | Cooperation units, base operations, defensive activity | Concluding from damage alone that it has exited the Middle East security order |\n| China's diplomatic influence | Mediation of agreements and their subsequent implementation | Concluding that successful mediation also proves an ability to provide military protection |\n| China's economic gains and losses | Energy procurement costs and shipping disruptions | Concluding that it incurs no losses because it does not directly enter the war |\n\n## Does using BeiDou mean combat information is transmitted to China?\n\nUsing BeiDou alone does not mean combat information is automatically sent to China. Basic GPS navigation works by receiving signals transmitted by satellites. A receiver uses those signals to calculate its position and time. That process does not itself send information from the receiver to a satellite. [GPS.gov system description](https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/index.php)\n\nBeiDou also has a short-message communication function in addition to navigation. A white paper from the China National Space Administration describes a position-reporting function as well. Navigation signal reception must therefore be distinguished from use of a communication function. Determining which function was used requires examination of the actual equipment and operating records. [China National Space Administration white paper on BeiDou](https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6480542/content.html)\n\nWhether specific Iranian weapons systems used BeiDou requires separate verification. Even if their use is confirmed, that would not automatically prove that China collected information. Claims that US military interception information was passed along require further evidence. The technical documents examined in this article do not substantiate that claim.\n\n| Claim | Additional evidence needed |\n| --- | --- |\n| A specific weapon used BeiDou | Equipment analysis, operating records, reliable official confirmation |\n| Operational information was transmitted to China | Evidence that a communication function was actually used and identification of who received the data |\n| China learned how the US military defends against attacks | The contents of the collected data and the results of its analysis |\n\n## Is Türkiye taking over regional dominance?\n\nAn expansion of Türkiye's influence and its acquisition of regional dominance are different claims. The Council of the EU says accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018. But stalled accession negotiations do not mean all ties with the West have been severed. Türkiye is also a NATO member. [Council of the EU explanation of Türkiye](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/turkiye/), [NATO explanation of Türkiye](https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/history-by-theme/my-country-and-nato/tuerkiye-and-nato)\n\nExplaining the EU accession issue through a leader's feelings leaves little basis for understanding policy. Strong statements about Israel do not amount to securing regional leadership, either. Influence depends on whether other countries actually cooperate. The phrase “revival of the Ottoman Empire” does little to measure it.\n\nThe following factors can be assessed separately when evaluating regional influence:\n\n- The ability to participate in diplomatic negotiations and help implement agreements\n- Resources to sustain military cooperation over a long period\n- The scope of cooperative relationships accepted by neighboring countries\n- The cost of foreign activities that the domestic economy can bear\n\n## The Strait of Hormuz and gains and losses under different conditions\n\nTo assess the gains and losses of oil-producing countries in a war, oil prices and actual export volumes must be considered together. Revenue can fall even if export prices rise, if sales volumes decline. Higher repair and shipping costs change the calculation again. This is why a price increase alone does not make an oil-producing country a winner.\n\nAccording to EIA, 20.9 million barrels per day of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz in the first half of 2025. During the same period, 89% of the crude oil and condensate passing through it was headed to Asia. Condensate is a light liquid hydrocarbon obtained during gas production. These figures show the shipping structure during that period. [EIA maritime shipping analysis](https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/?id_mc=277158333)\n\nThe following table is an analysis of different conditions, not a statement of confirmed war outcomes. What a country gains or loses changes with the conditions. In particular, the operation of export facilities and shipping routes affects the outcome.\n\n| Conditions | Potential effects | Costs that could also arise |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Oil prices rise and export volumes hold steady | Possible increase in oil-producing countries' export revenue | Higher insurance premiums and shipping costs |\n| Oil prices rise and export volumes fall | Higher prices for the remaining exports | Lower sales and disruptions to facility operations |\n| Diplomatic mediation makes progress | Possible increase in influence over negotiations | Burden of implementing an agreement |\n| Desalination and power facilities are damaged | Little prospect of direct economic gain | Repair costs and disruption to daily life and business |\n| Energy shipping is disrupted for a long period | Possible sales opportunities for alternative suppliers | Higher procurement costs and supply insecurity for importing countries |\n\nEIA also describes bypass pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But bypass routes cannot replace all shipping through the strait. The existence of bypass facilities and sufficient spare capacity are different matters. Their actual operating status must be checked to determine how much oil can be rerouted. [EIA analysis of routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz](https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/?id_mc=277158333)\n\n## Common mistakes in interpreting a war in the Middle East\n\nTreating different measures as equivalent distorts judgments about winners and losers. The number of attacks is not the same as the value of the damage. The amount spent on weapons is not the same as actual defensive capability, either. The meaning of the measure used to support a claim must be checked first.\n\n| Common interpretation | What needs to be checked |\n| --- | --- |\n| The UAE suffered the greatest damage | A comparison of deaths, injuries, facility damage, and economic losses over the same period |\n| Large weapons purchases mean a country can easily retaliate | Operational capability, defensive objectives, and the cost of escalation |\n| Restoring diplomatic relations ended the hostile relationship | Implementation of the agreement and remaining security conflicts |\n| The presence of a US military base guarantees complete safety | Actual defensive coverage and response capability |\n| Higher energy prices mean a net gain for the entire country | Export volumes, repair costs, and private-sector losses |\n\nOn May 4, 2026, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Iranian attacks. Its announcement described attacks targeting civilian facilities and reported injuries. But it did not rank the total damage suffered by different countries. Confirming that attacks occurred is different from determining which country suffered the most damage. [UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement of May 4, 2026](https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2026/5/4/uae-missiles)\n\n## Why a country's gains can differ from harm to its residents\n\nDiplomatic gains at the national level do not necessarily improve residents' lives. Disruptions to water supplies can occur even if a country's influence as a mediator grows. Even if export revenue increases, damaged areas may still face the burden of reconstruction. A country's gains and losses must therefore be assessed separately from those of its residents.\n\nThe link between desalination and electricity illustrates this difference. Problems with distribution can arise even if water production facilities remain intact. Conversely, reservoirs and connecting pipelines may reduce the impact of damage. The test is whether services actually continue, not simply whether facilities exist.\n\n- Public finances are assessed by considering both export revenue and reconstruction spending.\n- Businesses are assessed by considering production and shipping disruptions alongside additional costs.\n- Residents' lives are assessed by the actual supply of drinking water and electricity.\n- Diplomatic achievements are assessed by whether announced agreements are implemented.","content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe winners and losers of a war in the Middle East cannot be determined by military outcomes alone. Gulf states have pursued security cooperation while managing their relations with Iran. Damage to desalination and export facilities must be weighed alongside diplomatic gains.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe maritime shipping figures are based on EIA data for the first half of 2025.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#what-is-the-gulf-states-balanced-diplomacy\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"what-is-the-gulf-states-balanced-diplomacy\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWhat is the Gulf states' balanced diplomacy?\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Gulf states' balanced diplomacy means choosing partners according to the issue. They can cooperate militarily with the United States while talking with Iran. They can also maintain economic cooperation with China alongside those relationships.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn this article, Gulf states means the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. Iran is a Gulf coastal state, but it is not a GCC member.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eArab and Islamic are different categories. Arab refers to a linguistic and cultural identity. Islam is a religion. Grouping Iran and Türkiye with Arab states leads to a mistaken reading of their relationships.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSectarian divisions alone cannot explain foreign policy, either. Territorial disputes and resource development create separate interests. Reducing conflict with neighboring states can also help protect the political system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#comparing-the-interests-of-saudi-arabia-the-uae-qatar-and-oman\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"comparing-the-interests-of-saudi-arabia-the-uae-qatar-and-oman\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eComparing the interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGulf states have different reasons both to disagree with Iran and to talk with it. Restoring diplomatic relations does not mean resolving every security conflict. Conversely, a territorial dispute does not always end diplomatic contact.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"overflow-x-auto\"\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\n\u003cthead\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eCountry\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eConfirmed relationships and interests\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eHow to interpret its diplomacy\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/thead\u003e\n\u003ctbody\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Country\"\u003eSaudi Arabia\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Confirmed relationships and interests\"\u003eAgreed to resume diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"How to interpret its diplomacy\"\u003eDistinguish normalization from security competition\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Country\"\u003eUAE\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Confirmed relationships and interests\"\u003eTerritorial dispute with Iran over islands; normalized relations with Israel\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"How to interpret its diplomacy\"\u003eExamine territorial and security issues separately from diplomatic channels\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Country\"\u003eQatar\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Confirmed relationships and interests\"\u003eResource structure involving an offshore gas field connected to Iran\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"How to interpret its diplomacy\"\u003eConsider both resource development and the safety of export routes\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Country\"\u003eOman\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Confirmed relationships and interests\"\u003eMediated talks between the United States and Iran\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"How to interpret its diplomacy\"\u003eDistinguish mediation from support for a particular side\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#saudi-arabias-development-plans-and-relations-with-iran\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"saudi-arabias-development-plans-and-relations-with-iran\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSaudi Arabia's development plans and relations with Iran\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSaudi Arabia created a channel for managing conflict by restoring relations with Iran. The two countries agreed in Beijing on March 10, 2023, to resume relations. Their joint statement also included principles of respect for sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. The original text is available in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' \u003ca href=\"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/xwlb_663592/202303/t20230311_11039241.html\"\u003etrilateral joint statement\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSaudi Arabia's Vision 2030 seeks to diversify its economy. Its goals also include expanding tourism, logistics, and private investment. It is reasonable to interpret regional instability as raising the cost of these projects. But development plans alone cannot explain every foreign policy decision. \u003ca href=\"https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/overview\"\u003eVision 2030 overview\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#the-uaes-territorial-dispute-and-diplomatic-channels\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"the-uaes-territorial-dispute-and-diplomatic-channels\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eThe UAE's territorial dispute and diplomatic channels\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe conflict between the UAE and Iran includes a specific territorial issue. Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb are disputed islands. Iran controls the islands, while the UAE claims sovereignty over them. The GCC also supports the UAE's position. \u003ca href=\"https://gccsg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-6-2-3.aspx\"\u003eGCC Ministerial Council statement\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe UAE signed a treaty normalizing relations with Israel in 2020. In 2022, it announced plans to return its ambassador to Iran. The two decisions show how it maintained different diplomatic relationships at the same time. Labeling the UAE pro-Israel does not explain its entire policy toward Iran. \u003ca href=\"https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002805a7d1f\"\u003eUN treaty record\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"https://www.mofa.gov.ae/ar-ae/mediahub/news/2022/8/21/21-08-2022-uae\"\u003eUAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement on the ambassador's return\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#qatars-gas-field-and-omans-mediation\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"qatars-gas-field-and-omans-mediation\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eQatar's gas field and Oman's mediation\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eQatar produces resources from an offshore gas field connected to Iran. The Qatari side is called the North Field. The Iranian side is called South Pars. This structure gives the two countries reason to consider energy stability in their relationship. \u003ca href=\"https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/countries/qat\"\u003eEIA analysis of Qatar\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOman's role is to keep a channel for dialogue open. Oman mediated negotiations between the United States and Iran in 2025. But in June of the same year, it announced the cancellation of scheduled talks. The existence of a mediation channel does not guarantee successful negotiations. \u003ca href=\"https://www.fm.gov.om/en/25922/\"\u003eOmani Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement of June 14, 2025\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#why-are-desalination-facilities-a-security-issue\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"why-are-desalination-facilities-a-security-issue\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWhy are desalination facilities a security issue?\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDesalination facilities are infrastructure that keeps cities supplied with water. Desalination removes salt from seawater to produce fresh water. In the Gulf region, water production and energy supply are closely linked. Water security is therefore hard to separate from power generation and transmission facilities. \u003ca href=\"https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gcc/publication/advancing-knowledge-of-the-water-energy-nexus-in-the-gcc-countries\"\u003eWorld Bank analysis of water and energy in the Gulf\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo compare levels of dependence, the ratios must first use the same basis. The share of drinking water supplied by desalination differs from its share of total water use. Total water use may also include water used in agriculture and industry. Production capacity and actual supply are different measures, too.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"overflow-x-auto\"\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\n\u003cthead\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eBasis of the figure\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eWhat it shows\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eCommon misunderstanding\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/thead\u003e\n\u003ctbody\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Basis of the figure\"\u003eDesalination's share of drinking water supply\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What it shows\"\u003eThe composition of the drinking water supply\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common misunderstanding\"\u003eAssuming the same share applies to agricultural water\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Basis of the figure\"\u003eDesalination's share of total water use\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What it shows\"\u003eHow water is used for various purposes\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common misunderstanding\"\u003eAssuming cities have low dependence on desalinated drinking water\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Basis of the figure\"\u003eProduction capacity of desalination facilities\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What it shows\"\u003eHow much the facilities can produce\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common misunderstanding\"\u003eTreating capacity as identical to actual supply\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Basis of the figure\"\u003eEmergency water reserves\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What it shows\"\u003eThe amount of stored water\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common misunderstanding\"\u003eTreating them as the time a city can last without restrictions on use\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDamage to desalination facilities does not mean an entire city immediately loses its water supply. Reservoirs and connecting pipelines can cushion the impact. Qatar's KAHRAMAA describes reservoir and pipeline projects for emergency response. How long supplies would actually last depends on the extent of the damage and the amount of water used. \u003ca href=\"https://www.km.qa/MediaCenter/pages/NewsDetails.aspx?ItemID=354\"\u003eKAHRAMAA's description of its water security projects\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClaims that a city would collapse within a specific period therefore need separate verification. Each country's water reserves and the operating status of its facilities must be checked first. It is reasonable to conclude that the vulnerability of desalination facilities raises the cost of escalation. It cannot be identified as the sole reason for every act of military restraint.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#have-the-united-states-exit-and-chinas-victory-been-confirmed\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"have-the-united-states-exit-and-chinas-victory-been-confirmed\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHave the United States' exit and China's victory been confirmed?\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is not enough evidence to conclude that the United States' security role in the Middle East has ended. In January 2026, US Central Command announced the opening of an air defense cooperation unit at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Its purpose is to strengthen regional cooperation on integrated air and missile defense. \u003ca href=\"https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4376614/us-regional-partners-open-new-air-defense-operations-cell-in-qatar/\"\u003eUS Central Command announcement\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThat announcement alone cannot establish how well the defense system performs in combat. But it must be distinguished from a claim that the cooperation structure has disappeared. The fact that an attack caused damage does not mean the United States has fully withdrawn. Defensive performance and the continuation of its presence and cooperation are different questions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eChina gained a diplomatic achievement in the process of restoring relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the same time, China has an interest in the Gulf region's energy supply. EIA describes China as a major destination for energy passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Diplomatic gains alone therefore cannot establish China's overall net gain from a war. \u003ca href=\"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/xwlb_663592/202303/t20230311_11039241.html\"\u003eTrilateral joint statement\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/?id_mc=277158333\"\u003eEIA maritime shipping analysis\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"overflow-x-auto\"\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\n\u003cthead\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eWhat is being assessed\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eIndicators to check\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eConclusion that is hard to justify\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/thead\u003e\n\u003ctbody\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What is being assessed\"\u003eThe United States' security role\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Indicators to check\"\u003eCooperation units, base operations, defensive activity\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conclusion that is hard to justify\"\u003eConcluding from damage alone that it has exited the Middle East security order\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What is being assessed\"\u003eChina's diplomatic influence\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Indicators to check\"\u003eMediation of agreements and their subsequent implementation\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conclusion that is hard to justify\"\u003eConcluding that successful mediation also proves an ability to provide military protection\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What is being assessed\"\u003eChina's economic gains and losses\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Indicators to check\"\u003eEnergy procurement costs and shipping disruptions\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conclusion that is hard to justify\"\u003eConcluding that it incurs no losses because it does not directly enter the war\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#does-using-beidou-mean-combat-information-is-transmitted-to-china\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"does-using-beidou-mean-combat-information-is-transmitted-to-china\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDoes using BeiDou mean combat information is transmitted to China?\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUsing BeiDou alone does not mean combat information is automatically sent to China. Basic GPS navigation works by receiving signals transmitted by satellites. A receiver uses those signals to calculate its position and time. That process does not itself send information from the receiver to a satellite. \u003ca href=\"https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/index.php\"\u003eGPS.gov system description\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBeiDou also has a short-message communication function in addition to navigation. A white paper from the China National Space Administration describes a position-reporting function as well. Navigation signal reception must therefore be distinguished from use of a communication function. Determining which function was used requires examination of the actual equipment and operating records. \u003ca href=\"https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6480542/content.html\"\u003eChina National Space Administration white paper on BeiDou\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhether specific Iranian weapons systems used BeiDou requires separate verification. Even if their use is confirmed, that would not automatically prove that China collected information. Claims that US military interception information was passed along require further evidence. The technical documents examined in this article do not substantiate that claim.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"overflow-x-auto\"\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\n\u003cthead\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eClaim\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eAdditional evidence needed\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/thead\u003e\n\u003ctbody\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Claim\"\u003eA specific weapon used BeiDou\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Additional evidence needed\"\u003eEquipment analysis, operating records, reliable official confirmation\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Claim\"\u003eOperational information was transmitted to China\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Additional evidence needed\"\u003eEvidence that a communication function was actually used and identification of who received the data\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Claim\"\u003eChina learned how the US military defends against attacks\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Additional evidence needed\"\u003eThe contents of the collected data and the results of its analysis\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#is-t%C3%BCrkiye-taking-over-regional-dominance\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"is-türkiye-taking-over-regional-dominance\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIs Türkiye taking over regional dominance?\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn expansion of Türkiye's influence and its acquisition of regional dominance are different claims. The Council of the EU says accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018. But stalled accession negotiations do not mean all ties with the West have been severed. Türkiye is also a NATO member. \u003ca href=\"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/turkiye/\"\u003eCouncil of the EU explanation of Türkiye\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/history-by-theme/my-country-and-nato/tuerkiye-and-nato\"\u003eNATO explanation of Türkiye\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExplaining the EU accession issue through a leader's feelings leaves little basis for understanding policy. Strong statements about Israel do not amount to securing regional leadership, either. Influence depends on whether other countries actually cooperate. The phrase “revival of the Ottoman Empire” does little to measure it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe following factors can be assessed separately when evaluating regional influence:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe ability to participate in diplomatic negotiations and help implement agreements\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eResources to sustain military cooperation over a long period\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe scope of cooperative relationships accepted by neighboring countries\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe cost of foreign activities that the domestic economy can bear\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#the-strait-of-hormuz-and-gains-and-losses-under-different-conditions\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"the-strait-of-hormuz-and-gains-and-losses-under-different-conditions\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eThe Strait of Hormuz and gains and losses under different conditions\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo assess the gains and losses of oil-producing countries in a war, oil prices and actual export volumes must be considered together. Revenue can fall even if export prices rise, if sales volumes decline. Higher repair and shipping costs change the calculation again. This is why a price increase alone does not make an oil-producing country a winner.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to EIA, 20.9 million barrels per day of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz in the first half of 2025. During the same period, 89% of the crude oil and condensate passing through it was headed to Asia. Condensate is a light liquid hydrocarbon obtained during gas production. These figures show the shipping structure during that period. \u003ca href=\"https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/?id_mc=277158333\"\u003eEIA maritime shipping analysis\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe following table is an analysis of different conditions, not a statement of confirmed war outcomes. What a country gains or loses changes with the conditions. In particular, the operation of export facilities and shipping routes affects the outcome.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"overflow-x-auto\"\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\n\u003cthead\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eConditions\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003ePotential effects\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eCosts that could also arise\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/thead\u003e\n\u003ctbody\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conditions\"\u003eOil prices rise and export volumes hold steady\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Potential effects\"\u003ePossible increase in oil-producing countries' export revenue\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Costs that could also arise\"\u003eHigher insurance premiums and shipping costs\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conditions\"\u003eOil prices rise and export volumes fall\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Potential effects\"\u003eHigher prices for the remaining exports\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Costs that could also arise\"\u003eLower sales and disruptions to facility operations\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conditions\"\u003eDiplomatic mediation makes progress\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Potential effects\"\u003ePossible increase in influence over negotiations\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Costs that could also arise\"\u003eBurden of implementing an agreement\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conditions\"\u003eDesalination and power facilities are damaged\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Potential effects\"\u003eLittle prospect of direct economic gain\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Costs that could also arise\"\u003eRepair costs and disruption to daily life and business\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Conditions\"\u003eEnergy shipping is disrupted for a long period\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Potential effects\"\u003ePossible sales opportunities for alternative suppliers\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Costs that could also arise\"\u003eHigher procurement costs and supply insecurity for importing countries\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEIA also describes bypass pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But bypass routes cannot replace all shipping through the strait. The existence of bypass facilities and sufficient spare capacity are different matters. Their actual operating status must be checked to determine how much oil can be rerouted. \u003ca href=\"https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/?id_mc=277158333\"\u003eEIA analysis of routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#common-mistakes-in-interpreting-a-war-in-the-middle-east\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"common-mistakes-in-interpreting-a-war-in-the-middle-east\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCommon mistakes in interpreting a war in the Middle East\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTreating different measures as equivalent distorts judgments about winners and losers. The number of attacks is not the same as the value of the damage. The amount spent on weapons is not the same as actual defensive capability, either. The meaning of the measure used to support a claim must be checked first.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"overflow-x-auto\"\u003e\u003ctable\u003e\n\u003cthead\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eCommon interpretation\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003cth\u003eWhat needs to be checked\u003c/th\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/thead\u003e\n\u003ctbody\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common interpretation\"\u003eThe UAE suffered the greatest damage\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What needs to be checked\"\u003eA comparison of deaths, injuries, facility damage, and economic losses over the same period\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common interpretation\"\u003eLarge weapons purchases mean a country can easily retaliate\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What needs to be checked\"\u003eOperational capability, defensive objectives, and the cost of escalation\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common interpretation\"\u003eRestoring diplomatic relations ended the hostile relationship\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What needs to be checked\"\u003eImplementation of the agreement and remaining security conflicts\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common interpretation\"\u003eThe presence of a US military base guarantees complete safety\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What needs to be checked\"\u003eActual defensive coverage and response capability\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"Common interpretation\"\u003eHigher energy prices mean a net gain for the entire country\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003ctd data-label=\"What needs to be checked\"\u003eExport volumes, repair costs, and private-sector losses\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn May 4, 2026, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Iranian attacks. Its announcement described attacks targeting civilian facilities and reported injuries. But it did not rank the total damage suffered by different countries. Confirming that attacks occurred is different from determining which country suffered the most damage. \u003ca href=\"https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2026/5/4/uae-missiles\"\u003eUAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement of May 4, 2026\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"#why-a-countrys-gains-can-differ-from-harm-to-its-residents\" class=\"anchor\" id=\"why-a-countrys-gains-can-differ-from-harm-to-its-residents\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWhy a country's gains can differ from harm to its residents\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDiplomatic gains at the national level do not necessarily improve residents' lives. Disruptions to water supplies can occur even if a country's influence as a mediator grows. Even if export revenue increases, damaged areas may still face the burden of reconstruction. A country's gains and losses must therefore be assessed separately from those of its residents.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe link between desalination and electricity illustrates this difference. Problems with distribution can arise even if water production facilities remain intact. Conversely, reservoirs and connecting pipelines may reduce the impact of damage. The test is whether services actually continue, not simply whether facilities exist.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePublic finances are assessed by considering both export revenue and reconstruction spending.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBusinesses are assessed by considering production and shipping disruptions alongside additional costs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eResidents' lives are assessed by the actual supply of drinking water and electricity.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDiplomatic achievements are assessed by whether announced agreements are implemented.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","tags":["Strait of Hormuz","Global economy","Power grid","Geopolitics","Global oil prices"],"faqs":[{"question":"Are all Gulf countries hostile to Iran?","answer":"Relations vary by country. Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023. The UAE has a territorial dispute with Iran, while Qatar has an interest in a gas field linked to Iran."},{"question":"Does the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran mean they have a military alliance?","answer":"It does not mean they have a military alliance. The main point of the 2023 joint statement was an agreement to restore diplomatic relations and reopen embassies. It cannot be taken to mean that all security conflicts have been resolved."},{"question":"Did the UAE hold talks with Iran while cooperating with Israel?","answer":"There have been instances of the UAE pursuing both diplomatic approaches. The UAE signed a treaty normalizing relations with Israel in 2020. In 2022, it announced plans to return its ambassador to Iran."},{"question":"Why do sources give different figures for Gulf countries' dependence on desalination?","answer":"They may use different measures, such as drinking water versus total water use. The year of the statistics and the area covered must also be checked. A facility's production capacity must be distinguished from the amount it actually supplies."},{"question":"If desalination facilities are attacked, does the entire country immediately lose its water supply?","answer":"It cannot be assumed that the entire country would immediately lose its water supply. Water storage facilities and connected pipelines can cushion the impact. The effects depend on damage to facilities, the power supply, and the state of emergency operations."},{"question":"Can the United States be considered to have completely withdrawn from the Middle East?","answer":"The official announcements reviewed in this article do not support that conclusion. U.S. Central Command announced the opening of an air defense cooperation organization in Qatar in January 2026. Defense outcomes and the existence of security cooperation must be assessed separately."},{"question":"Does China avoid losses because it is not directly taking part in the war?","answer":"China can be affected by disruptions to energy supplies even without directly taking part in the war. China is a major importer of energy that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Diplomatic gains and changes in procurement costs must be assessed together."},{"question":"If Iran uses BeiDou, does China automatically obtain information about U.S. forces?","answer":"The use of BeiDou alone does not support that conclusion. Receiving navigation signals and transmitting information are different functions. Evidence is needed to establish whether information was actually transmitted, what the data contained, and who received it."},{"question":"Do Gulf oil-producing countries benefit when oil prices rise?","answer":"It depends on whether actual export volumes are maintained. Even if prices rise, falling export volumes and rising repair costs can cause losses. It is difficult to determine the economic winners of a war based on oil prices alone."},{"question":"Does the stalling of Türkiye's EU accession talks mean a break with the West?","answer":"Stalled accession talks and a break with the West are not the same thing. Türkiye is a NATO member. Its role in the Middle East must also be assessed based on specific cooperation and actual results."}],"sources":[{"url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/xwlb_663592/202303/t20230311_11039241.html","title":"Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement by China, Saudi Arabia and Iran, March 10, 2023","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/overview","title":"Saudi Vision 2030, Overview","type":"source"},{"url":"https://gccsg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-6-2-3.aspx","title":"GCC, Final Statement of the 164th Ministerial Meeting, June 2, 2025","type":"source"},{"url":"https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002805a7d1f","title":"UN Treaty Collection, Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Normalization between the UAE and Israel","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.mofa.gov.ae/ar-ae/mediahub/news/2022/8/21/21-08-2022-uae","title":"UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Plans to return its ambassador to Iran, August 21, 2022","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/countries/qat","title":"U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Qatar Country Energy Analysis","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.fm.gov.om/en/25922/","title":"Oman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Announcement of the cancellation of scheduled U.S.-Iran talks in Muscat, June 14, 2025","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gcc/publication/advancing-knowledge-of-the-water-energy-nexus-in-the-gcc-countries","title":"World Bank, Advancing Knowledge of the Water-Energy Nexus in the GCC Countries","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.km.qa/MediaCenter/pages/NewsDetails.aspx?ItemID=354","title":"Qatar KAHRAMAA, Description of water and energy security and the strategic water reservoir facilities project","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4376614/us-regional-partners-open-new-air-defense-operations-cell-in-qatar/","title":"U.S. Central Command, Announcement of the establishment of a Qatar air defense cooperation organization, January 2026","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/?id_mc=277158333","title":"U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), World Oil Transit Chokepoints, transit statistics for the first half of 2025","type":"data_point"},{"url":"https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/index.php","title":"GPS.gov, GPS Overview","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6480542/content.html","title":"China National Space Administration, China releases white paper on BeiDou navigation satellite system","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/turkiye/","title":"Council of the EU, Türkiye's accession negotiations and cooperative relations","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/history-by-theme/my-country-and-nato/tuerkiye-and-nato","title":"NATO, Türkiye and NATO","type":"source"},{"url":"https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2026/5/4/uae-missiles","title":"UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement condemning Iran's missile and drone attacks, May 4, 2026","type":"source"}],"images":[{"id":1920,"url":"https://injoys.com/rails/active_storage/blobs/proxy/eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsiZGF0YSI6Mjk1NjUsInB1ciI6ImJsb2JfaWQifX0=--6945995f53bd743b074230932ab19d309258811d/ai-1fc12c2a.webp","is_representative":true,"generation_method":"ai_photo","license":"ai_generated","mime_type":"image/webp","width":1536,"height":1024,"translations":{"ko":{"alt":"안전모를 쓴 여성이 대형 청록색 배관 옆에서 태블릿을 들고 있고, 바다 건너 유조선이 보인다.","caption":"담수화·에너지 시설의 취약성은 전쟁이 확대될 때 치러야 할 비용을 높입니다.","description":null},"en":{"alt":"A woman in a hard hat holds a tablet beside a large turquoise pipe, with a tanker across the water.","caption":"Vulnerable desalination and energy facilities raise the cost of a wider war.","description":null},"ja":{"alt":"ヘルメット姿の女性が大きな青緑色の配管のそばでタブレットを持ち、海の向こうにタンカーが見える。","caption":"淡水化施設とエネルギー施設の脆弱性は、戦争拡大の代償を高めます。","description":null},"es":{"alt":"Una mujer con casco sostiene una tableta junto a una gran tubería turquesa; al otro lado del agua hay un petrolero.","caption":"La vulnerabilidad de las instalaciones de desalinización y energía eleva el costo de una escalada bélica.","description":null},"id":{"alt":"Perempuan berhelm memegang tablet di samping pipa besar berwarna pirus, dengan kapal tanker di seberang perairan.","caption":"Kerentanan fasilitas desalinasi dan energi meningkatkan biaya jika perang meluas.","description":null},"pt":{"alt":"Uma mulher de capacete segura um tablet junto a uma grande tubulação turquesa, com um navio-tanque do outro lado da água.","caption":"A vulnerabilidade das instalações de dessalinização e energia aumenta o custo de uma escalada da guerra.","description":null},"zh-hant":{"alt":"戴安全帽的女子手持平板電腦，站在大型藍綠色管線旁，水域對岸可見油輪。","caption":"海水淡化與能源設施的脆弱性，會提高戰事擴大的代價。","description":null},"de":{"alt":"Eine Frau mit Schutzhelm hält ein Tablet neben einer großen türkisfarbenen Leitung; jenseits des Wassers liegt ein Tanker.","caption":"Die Verwundbarkeit von Entsalzungs- und Energieanlagen erhöht die Kosten einer Ausweitung des Krieges.","description":null}}},{"id":1921,"url":"https://injoys.com/rails/active_storage/blobs/proxy/eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsiZGF0YSI6Mjk1NzEsInB1ciI6ImJsb2JfaWQifX0=--5c5c364a24956377f4294ad3f98d66516458f698/ai-bba57156.webp","is_representative":false,"generation_method":"ai_semi","license":"ai_generated","mime_type":"image/webp","width":1536,"height":1024,"translations":{"ko":{"alt":"전통 복장의 남성 세 명이 원탁에 앉아 대화하고, 가운데 남성이 두 사람의 말을 듣는다.","caption":"걸프 국가들은 군사 협력과 이란과의 관계 관리를 병행합니다.","description":null},"en":{"alt":"Three men in traditional dress sit at a round table, with the man in the middle listening to the others.","caption":"Gulf states balance military cooperation with managing relations with Iran.","description":null},"ja":{"alt":"伝統衣装の男性3人が円卓を囲み、中央の男性が両側の話に耳を傾けている。","caption":"湾岸諸国は軍事協力とイランとの関係管理を両立させています。","description":null},"es":{"alt":"Tres hombres con ropa tradicional conversan en una mesa redonda; el del centro escucha a los otros dos.","caption":"Los países del Golfo combinan la cooperación militar con la gestión de sus relaciones con Irán.","description":null},"id":{"alt":"Tiga pria berpakaian tradisional duduk di meja bundar; pria di tengah mendengarkan dua lainnya.","caption":"Negara-negara Teluk menjalankan kerja sama militer sambil mengelola hubungan dengan Iran.","description":null},"pt":{"alt":"Três homens em trajes tradicionais conversam à mesa redonda; o homem ao centro escuta os outros dois.","caption":"Os países do Golfo conciliam a cooperação militar com a gestão das relações com o Irã.","description":null},"zh-hant":{"alt":"三名身穿傳統服飾的男子圍坐圓桌交談，中間的男子聆聽兩側發言。","caption":"海灣國家一面維持軍事合作，一面管理與伊朗的關係。","description":null},"de":{"alt":"Drei Männer in traditioneller Kleidung sitzen an einem runden Tisch; der Mann in der Mitte hört den anderen zu.","caption":"Die Golfstaaten verbinden militärische Zusammenarbeit mit der Pflege ihrer Beziehungen zum Iran.","description":null}}}],"published_at":"2026-10-18T06:59:20+09:00","updated_at":"2026-10-18T06:59:20+09:00","license":"cc_by","translation_status":"reviewed","available_locales":["ko","en","ja","es"],"data_locales":["ko","en","ja","es","id","pt","zh-hant","de"],"url":"https://injoys.com/en/articles/middle-east-war-gulf-states-diplomacy-gains-losses"}