The success or failure of the 10.15 measures after 1 year should be assessed by separating price changes from policy effects. The analysis reports larger increases in sale and jeonse prices in regulated areas. However, the original statistical sources have not been verified. A before-and-after comparison alone also cannot establish that regulation caused the increases.
The market figures are claims made in “Success or Failure One Year After the 10.15 Measures” as of October 2026.
What the 10.15 measures confirm
The 10.15 measures are housing market measures that include expanding regulated areas and restricting lending. The government announced them on October 15, 2025. The designations cover Seoul’s 25 autonomous districts and 12 areas in Gyeonggi. The official announcement is titled “Housing Market Stabilization Measures.”
Expansion of regulated areas and land transaction permit zones to cover all of Seoul and 12 areas in Gyeonggi
The wording above appears in the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport’s announcement of the “Housing Market Stabilization Measures.” Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport announcement
The 12 areas in Gyeonggi include both entire cities and individual districts. It is therefore inaccurate to describe them as 12 cities in Gyeonggi. The designated areas in Seoul and Gyeonggi are as follows. Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport policy guide
| Category | Designated areas at the time of the announcement |
|---|---|
| Seoul | All 25 autonomous districts |
| Gyeonggi, city level | Gwacheon, Gwangmyeong, Uiwang, Hanam |
| Seongnam | Bundang-gu, Sujeong-gu, Jungwon-gu |
| Suwon | Yeongtong-gu, Jangan-gu, Paldal-gu |
| Anyang | Dongan-gu |
| Yongin | Suji-gu |
This was the scope at the time of the October 2025 announcement. Check the latest notices to confirm the designation status applicable to a current contract. (Verified status: Seoul’s 25 autonomous districts and 15 areas in Gyeonggi, effective July 1, 2026 · Source: rt.molit.go.kr · As of 2026-07-01 · Checked on 2026-11-16) Designations as adjustment target areas or speculative overheating districts must be distinguished from land transaction permits.
A decline in rental listings alone cannot establish that a jeonse shortage will occur in 2027.
What has been verified about the 1-year assessment figures
The original statistics behind the analysis’s price figures have not been verified. “Success or Failure One Year After the 10.15 Measures” does not identify the organization that compiled the price indices. It also does not explain how the regulated-area average was calculated. The table below reorganizes the figures in that analysis.
| Item | Verified information | Information requiring further verification |
|---|---|---|
| Policy details | Government announcement and Financial Services Commission lending guidance | Subsequent amendments or removals of restrictions |
| Sale and jeonse price increases | Periods and figures stated in the analysis | Compiling organization, index names, original statistical tables |
| Regulated-area averages | Claims of 15.49% for sale prices and 11.18% for jeonse prices | Regional weights and areas included |
| Seoul rental listings | Counts the analysis attributes to Asil | Search screens and aggregation conditions at the time |
| Rankings by price increase | Claim that regulated areas were concentrated near the top | Complete rankings and comparison areas |
The Korea Real Estate Board publishes monthly housing price time-series statistics. However, it has not been confirmed whether the analysis’s figures came from these statistics. They should not be labeled as Korea Real Estate Board statistics without verifying the source. Statistical description on the Public Data Portal
Before-and-after comparison of sale prices
According to the analysis’s figures, sale prices rose more sharply after the measures. The earlier period runs from October 2024 to October 2025. The later period runs from October 2025 to October 2026. The differences in the table were calculated by subtracting the earlier rates of increase from the later ones.
| Apartment sale price category | Increase over the preceding 1 year | Increase over the following 1 year | Difference in increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nationwide | 0.40% | 4.43% | 4.03 percentage points |
| Seoul metropolitan area | 2.71% | 8.44% | 5.73 percentage points |
| Regulated areas as defined in the analysis | 7.37% | 15.49% | 8.12 percentage points |
Dividing the 2 nationwide rates gives a ratio of 11 times. This is the ratio between the rates of increase, not a claim that housing prices became 11 times higher. The ratio appears large because the earlier increase was small, at 0.40%. The scale of the change should be read alongside the difference of 4.03 percentage points.
The analysis also presents long-term average nationwide increases. The average for 2016~2025 is 2.61%. The average for 2006~2025 is listed as 3.29%. However, it remains necessary to verify whether these are averages of annual increases or were calculated another way.
Jeonse prices and regional differences
In the analysis, jeonse price increases accelerated in every regional grouping. The comparison periods are the same as in the sale price table. The method used to calculate the long-term averages has not been verified. The long-term averages in the table are also figures provided by the analysis.
| Apartment jeonse price category | Preceding 1 year | Following 1 year | 2016~2025 average | 2006~2025 average |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nationwide | 1.10% | 5.16% | 1.20% | 3.70% |
| Seoul metropolitan area | 2.28% | 7.94% | 1.95% | 4.25% |
| Regulated areas as defined in the analysis | 3.56% | 11.18% | Not provided | Not provided |
| 5 regional metropolitan cities | 0.26% | 3.20% | 0.38% | 3.13% |
| Other regions | -0.27% | 2.01% | Not provided | Not provided |
The 5 regional metropolitan cities are Busan, Daegu, Gwangju, Daejeon, and Ulsan. Other regions include Sejong and provincial areas outside the Seoul metropolitan area. According to the analysis, regional sale prices also shifted from declines to increases. However, the exact sale price increases for those regional groupings are not stated.
Rising jeonse prices are a signal to check whether supply is insufficient relative to rental demand. But the rates of increase alone do not prove that excess supply has been absorbed. The number of homes becoming available for occupancy and changes in unsold inventory must also be checked. Explaining weak sale prices solely through investor sentiment also has limitations.
Why regulated-area price increases alone cannot determine success or failure
Regulated areas were already a group with high price increases before the measures. According to the analysis, regulated areas recorded an increase of 7.37% over the preceding 1 year. The Seoul metropolitan area recorded 2.71% over the same period. This means the groups were already following different trends.
The fact that prices rose is different from regulation having caused prices to rise. Prices after the measures also reflect other conditions, including interest rates and supply. Policy effects must be assessed against what would have happened without regulation. That hypothetical price path cannot be determined from before-and-after increases alone.
| Question to assess | Comparison needed | What before-and-after increases alone can establish |
|---|---|---|
| Whether actual prices stabilized | Before-and-after price trends using the same index | Observed outcomes can be assessed if the figures are verified |
| Whether regulation restrained increases | Comparison with areas that had similar prior trends | The size of the effect cannot be established |
| Whether regulation reduced rental supply | Changes in rental listings, contracts, and homes becoming available for occupancy | Causes cannot be isolated |
| Whether the measures helped manage household debt | Loan growth and borrowing structure | Cannot be assessed using price indices alone |
The gap between the price stabilization goal and the observed outcomes can therefore be pointed out. However, it should not immediately be interpreted as evidence that regulation raised prices. Conversely, the claim that regulation prevented larger increases also requires evidence.